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Philosophy as Metaphysics
The meaning of such notions as «metaphysics» 
or «metaphysical» is very much dependent 
on the context and the goals of enunciation: it 
varies according to a series of comparisons and 
contrasts in which these notions are used. Yet, it 
is possible to say that metaphysics is the constant 
and unchanging topic in the history of Western 
philosophy. Although metaphysics is never a 
problem in itself, once philosophy as a discipline 
is considered a problem, metaphysics – regardless 
of the forms it might take – becomes a key issue.
In Aristotle’s fourth volume of «Metaphysics» 
the philosopher defines «being» as something 
common to all things and devotes a specific field 
of philosophy to it: the philosophy of «being» as 
being. Aristotle contrasts this science of being 
as being with the sciences that study only parts 
of being. Indeed, this contrast Aristotle draws 
is justifiable as the science of being is never 
limited to a certain region of being. Contrariwise, 
it explores the nature of being as being 
comprehensively.  Hereby, just as we attempt to 
comprehend the source and the cause in every 
science, we have to seek for the source of being 
and its causes. This very search for the origins of 
being will be later called metaphysics. «There is 
a science which investigates being as being and 
its features. Now this is not the same as any of 
the so-called special sciences; for none of these 
others treats universally being as being. They 
take a part of being and investigate some features 
of this part; this is what the mathematical sciences 
do» (Aristotel, 1975, p. 119). The expression “as 
being” is crucial, and is indeed the condition of 
possibility of the overall affirmation insofar as 
Aristotle rejects the possibility of a single, all-
encompassing science for all beings, as well as the 
attribution to all beings of properties that belong 
to a being by virtue of its own  nature. Also, by 
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the virtue of the expression “as being” Aristotle 
excludes the possibility of a science of being as 
a science that would explore certain regions of 
being. Aristotle understands the science of being 
exactly in the following way:  «There is a science 
which investigates being as being». That is, for 
Aristotle the science of being is a science that 
would explore being only insofar as it is in itself. 
The possibility of studying beings with respect 
to their being or to their becoming – this is what 
Aristotle seeks to explore. Not all beings or beings 
as whole, but beings in its own being, any beings 
in its becoming – this is what Aristotle’s science 
of being is concerned with. The expression “as 
being” points exactly to being intrinsic to all 
beings. 
Aristotle – as Plato – call this fact of being 
ousia:«Indeed the question which was raised long 
ago, is still and always will be, and which always 
baffles us – “What is being?” – is, in other words, 
“What is ousia?” For it is this that some assert 
to be one, others more than one, and that some 
assert to be limited in number, others unlimited. 
And so, we must consider chiefly and primarily 
and almost exclusively what that is which is in 
this sense» (Aristotel, 1975, p. 188). If ousia is 
something intrinsic to absolutely everything, 
it is because it underlies and upholds beings as 
a whole. It is a common sub-strat or substance 
that expresses essence of beings. Everything 
that is, exists on the basis of ousia as a reason, 
foundation or beginning. Thus, the meaning of 
being equates with the meaning of existence. It 
states that the science of being as being – is, in 
other words, the science of the foundation which 
beings is constituted upon. Ontology is primarily 
the science of the essence of being. From the 
whole plurality of meanings of being, ousia is the 
most fundamental one. Indeed, among different 
meanings of being, only ousia has an independent 
status. Any beings contain it and only through 
ousia we can comprehend existing anything.  
In «Physics» Aristotle defines ousia as 
upokeimenon (Aristotel, 1983, p. 83). This gesture 
of equating ousia with upokeimenon has the 
double meaning: first, ousia and upokeimenon – 
as equivalents – denote something that is present, 
that lays-before-us, second, they denote something 
that lays-before-what-is-present, something that 
founds what lays-before-us. In the first meaning 
of these terms ousia and upokeimenon rea equal 
as equivalent and interchangeable – Aristotle 
use them both to define what lays-before-us. 
According to this first meaning, everything that 
comes to being is a substance. As a preliminary 
inference of the first way to understand ousia it is 
possible to put forward the following statement: 
ousia as beingness describes both the sublunary 
world and divine being in such a way that it 
characterizes beings in its presence or, with some 
reservations, in its being. Ousia, thus, describes 
both what exists in a perspective since the very 
moment its beings became actual and beings 
in the state of becoming or at birth. The first 
understanding of being can be equally referred 
to both physics and metaphysics, although these 
two fields dictate slightly different modalities and 
functions of the one and the same concept.  
The second meaning of equating ousia to 
upokeimenon makes us understand ousia as the 
substance of any thing, a constant core, owing 
to which a thing remains self-identical through 
all of its transformations. This second meaning 
of ousia Aristotle calls arche. Hence, the science 
of being in its presence is at the same time the 
science of arche-beginnings (arche-reasons). 
This second meaning of ousia is the decisive 
one for Aristotle: although being is said in many 
ways «obviously that which “is” primarily is 
the “what”, which indicates the substance of the 
thing. For when we say of what quality a thing 
is, we say that it is good or bad, not that it is three 
cubits long or that it is a man; but when we say 
what it is, we do not say “white” or “hot” or “three 
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cubits long”, but “a man” or ”a god”. And all other 
things are said to be because they are, some of 
them, quantities of that which is in this primary 
sense, others qualities of it, others affections of 
it, and others some other determination of it» 
(Aristotel, 1975, p. 187). Under being we should 
understand that unreducable core of being to 
which we may prescribe certain features but 
which nonetheless remains self-identical and 
unchangeable. Properly speaking, the science 
of being in its just sense, deals with beings in 
relation to its own being.
This dichotomy of the Aristotle’s basic concept 
has served as the foundation of philosophy since 
its very birth. Philosophy – in Aristotle’s sense, 
at least, – is asserted as the science of being in its 
becoming and the science of being as it is, of being 
as being. In other words, Aristotle’s philosophy 
is both the science of nature and the science of 
arche-reasons, foundations and beginnings. 
Alternatively speaking, philosophy is asserted 
by Aristotle both as physics and metaphysics. 
The whole technical equivocation of metaphysics 
acquires its logical foundation now, in the light 
of the dichotomy described above: metaphysics 
refers not only to that which follows physics or 
is behind it, but that which is on the other side of 
physics. At the same time, this duality of physics-
metaphysics is followed by yet another duality – on 
the one hand, philosophy is the science of beings 
in its presence (according to this understanding, 
philosophy explores being in both its earthly and 
heavenly presence), on the other hand, philosophy 
is the onto-theology, the science of beings in 
reference to its own being. Philosophy deals with 
essence of beings, a constant and invariable core, 
owing to which beings remains self-identical 
through all of its transformations. It follows that 
ontology anticipates and presupposes the science 
of divinity, or to theology. Or, if we look at the 
issue from another angle, theology is ontology 
right away, because theology refers to beings in 
its being and raises a question about essence of 
being as it is.  
Although, the philosophy of modernity 
develops the new concept of ousia, it still remains 
subordinated to the program of metaphysical 
explorations founded in antiquity. In modernity 
the question of being, which Aristotle thought to 
be the question of essence, transforms into the 
question of reflection. If metaphysics still holds 
the status of the «first philosophy», it is precisely 
due to the fact that it provides and guarantees 
ontological foundations for nature’s cognition. 
In modernity the locus of this guarantee, the 
substance which this foundation equates with, 
is the very human subjectivity or human nature. 
Thus, metaphysics gets restored in its rights in the 
philosophy of modernity, although it does so in a 
different locus – human nature. Moreover, «the 
first philosophy» further and fully regains its 
meaning in Hegel as a pinnacle and finalization 
of metaphysics of subjectivity: reason is not so 
much the human reason, but being itself, the 
substance of the material world. Reason as Spirit 
is both subjective and objective: «… Everything 
turns on grasping and expressing the True, not 
only as Substance, but equally as Subject (Hegel, 
1992, p. 9)».
From now on philosophy is metaphysics as 
the science of a priori structures of the presence 
of beings. It turns its face to the foundations 
(reasons) and its endeavor becomes the search 
for this foundation independent of how it can be 
understood – as being, language, human being or 
sociality.
Philosophy  
as Philosophy of science
The concept of philosophy as the philosophy 
of science relates to the so-called neokantian 
interpretation of philosophy as transcendental 
epistemology. Such an interpretation 
substantiates the limits and abilities of strictly 
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scientific cognition and establishes conditions for 
the cognition of all possible objects of scientific 
exploration. 
Philosophy of Kant is the theory of 
experience. Yet, as experience is given in 
mathematics and natural science, it follows that 
Kantian interpretation transforms philosophy 
into the study of conditional capabilities of 
mathematics and natural science. Herewith, 
experience is considered as a system of a priori 
knowledge exclusively. Undoubtedly, the rapidly 
developing mathematics in general and its rapidly 
developing role in natural science in particular 
had pushed neokantianism to the aforesaid 
interpretation of experience. That is, the goal 
of the critical philosophy of Kant is to establish 
the principles of the systematic cognition of the 
physique-mathematical world – principles of 
cognition, but not laws on nature. “Criticism is 
not a research of cognitive capabilities – it can 
be understood as Psycology, but it is a study if a 
science, pure sense as pure science. Philosophy 
is not a doctrine but it is criticism, it does not 
create a science about subjects of nature but it 
teaches hoe to reveal these delusions and helps 
to define the limits of cognition as no science can 
exist without it. As Philosophy does not claim to 
be a doctrine it deserves to be called “censor” 
and it realizes the notion experience possibility” 
(Cohen, 2006, p. 151). Thus, critical philosophy 
can be called transcendental precisely because 
it is turned not to the objects of cognition but to 
the methods of cognition. “In Kant theory priori 
bearers are space and time and as categories 
they shall be understood as methods and not as 
spiritual forms. This perception is a consequence 
of transcendental method and transcendental 
priori. In transcendental sense priori has only 
cognitive value but it is realized and confirmed 
by scientific means. That is why as a method 
there are two kinds of priori – contemplation and 
thinking. That is method of pure contemplation 
method is a mathematic method and thinking 
method is a mechanic method” (Cohen, 2006, 
160).
The benchmark of the transcendental 
epistemology is seen in the “transcendental 
method.” Why is this transcendental justification 
so necessary? This requirement consists of two 
parts.  Paul Natorp explains it in the following 
way, “The first one is correct information for 
the actual, historically justified facts of science, 
ethics, art, religion. As Philosophy cannot exist in 
the area of pure thought where pure sense might 
deal only with the ideas” (Natorp, 2006, р124). So 
Philosophy tries to go beyond Metaphysics and 
deals with experience, and creation of different 
objects. “But Law is a creative basis for any such 
work and the initial law will be clear to us if we 
call it logos, sense, ratio. And here lies the second 
requirement of transcendental method. Along 
with the facts there must be some justification of 
possibility and the lawful basis. It means that it is 
required to show and form pure lawful basis, the 
unity of logos, ratio in any creative work. So the 
method of Philosophy aims to perform creative 
work but at the same time learns this work in its 
pure lawful form and justifies it in this cognition. 
And due to it the method is raised above this 
work and makes it transcendental  in this pure 
methodical sense” (Natorp, 2006, 124-125). 
Yet, this demand – principal for the Marburg 
school – remains fully dependent on the situation 
of science itself. It follows that when in natural 
science there emerge new objects and objectives 
of study which are no more subordinated to the 
laws of classical mechanics, the philosophic and 
methodological systems of Marburg schools 
appear to be refuted. Hence, antisubstantialism 
emerges – the rejection of the search for the 
invariable and common substances of being 
and the logical method of extracting them 
mechanically from the contingent things and 
processes. Antisubstantialism is followed by the 
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further antimetaphysical principle of construction 
of a world picture.  Logos gets dispersed in 
different concepts of logic and language. In 
classical ontology to think meant to express and 
define (in a specific sense) things and substances 
in accordance to their genetic differences. Now, 
in accordance with the mathematized nature to 
think means to calculate. Calculating, in turn, 
relates to the ability to establish relations of 
dependence – functions. That is, categories get 
substituted by mathematical functions. The logic 
of mathematical function gets brought against 
the logic of genetic concept of to the concept of 
substance.
As a result of this, philosophy becomes the 
philosophy of science – epistemology in the sense 
that is the self-reflection of science, the science 
of concepts, principles and methods, owing to 
which science organizes its activity. Philosophy 
ceases to be «the science of all sciences» and 
turns into the empirical derivation of natural 
science. Rather, and in what constitutes its 
extreme thematization, best expressed by the 
logical positivism of the Vienna Circle, single 
goal of philosophy from now on is the logical 
and semiotic analysis of «language» of science. 
In other words, it analyzes the concepts science 
employs in its diverse forms, sentences and 
combinations of sentences and blocks traditional 
metaphysical aspirations. Philosophy is now 
sanctioned by science – as a form of ontological 
and logical foundation of the cognition – to be 
its philosophy and its methodology. From «the 
science of sciences» philosophy becomes «an 
under-labourer to science, solely concerned with 
the logical clarification of the propositions and 
method of empirical science» (Critchley, 2001, 
p. 95).
In relation to this scientific concept of the 
world what classical metaphysics had to offer 
becomes pointless – it cannot offer any cognitive 
content to science. «The development of modern 
logic has made it possible to give a new and 
sharper answer to the question of the validity 
and justification of metaphysics. The researches 
of applied logic or the theory of knowledge, 
which aim at clarifying the cognitive content of 
scientific statements and thereby the meanings of 
the terms that occur in the statements, by means 
of logical analysis, lead to a positive and to a 
negative result. The positive result is worked out 
in the domain of empirical science; the various 
concepts of the various branches of science are 
clarified; their formal-logical and epistemological 
connections are made explicit. In the domain of 
metaphysics, including all philosophy of value 
and normative theory, logical analysis yields the 
negative result that the alleged statements in this 
domain are entirely meaningless. Therewith a 
radical elimination of metaphysics is attained, 
which was not yet possible from the earlier 
antimetaphysical standpoints... In the strict sense, 
however, a sequence of words is meaningless if it 
does not, within a specified language, constitute 
a statement. It may happen that such a sequence 
of words looks like a statement at first glance; 
in that case we call it a pseudostatement. Our 
thesis, now, is that logical analysis reveals the 
alleged statements of metaphysics to be pseudo-
statements» (Carnap, 1998, p. 70).
Moreover, metaphysics itself becomes 
meaningless: «Indeed, the results we have 
obtained so far might give rise to view that 
there are many dangers of falling into nonsense, 
and that one must accordingly endeavour to 
avoid these traps with great care  if one wants 
to do metaphysics. But actually the situation is 
that meaningful metaphysical statements are 
impossible. This follows from the task which 
metaphysics sets itself: to discover and formulate 
a kind of knowledge which is not accessible 
to empirical science» (Carnap, 1998, p. 87). 
Traditional philosophy is best  for expressing “an 
attitude toward life”, not amenable to the rational 
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analysis. The most adequate way to express 
“an attitude toward life” is considered to be art. 
Philosophy is nothing else but the substitute of 
art.
Philosophy as Anthropology
Anthropological concept of philosophy 
is precisely the reaction to natural science’s 
reductionism of thought. Philosophy now 
transforms to refer to a human being not only 
as an onto-theoretical foundation of cognition 
of the world, but also its mean of production and 
reproduction. From now on philosophy becomes 
anthropocentric. Contrary to the cosmological and 
theological doctrines, philosophy as anthropology 
constructs the world in according to an image and 
likeness of a man.   
Kantian moment is paradigmatic even if 
transcendental subjectivity is not seen as an 
appropriate basis of the constancy of the world. 
In Modern Age metaphysical representation 
guaranteed the reality of the real and its 
objectivity. Representation erected itself in its 
own space of existence and employed this space 
as the measure for the essence’s being and the 
being of truth. It follows that a man in such 
a concept was represented exclusively as the 
subject of being for two reasons. First, truth was 
the guarantee of representation – in other words, 
authenticity. Second, being was representation in 
the sense of authenticity. In such a set up the role 
of a man could be nothing else but to be a subject 
of this fundamental representation. The area of 
this reigning subjectivity could be consequently 
characterized by the following: being was not the 
created being anymore, but the objective, authentic 
and represented being. Anthropology, thus, 
becomes necessary at the very moment when the 
autonomy of representation is denounced and it is 
in need of another support – be it transcendental, 
subjective, logical or philosophical one. The 
major questions of Kantian metaphysics –  «what 
am I able to know?», «what do I have to do?», 
«what should I rely on?» –  converge in the fourth 
question – which serves as the basis for the first 
three – «What is a man?» Metaphysics, ethics 
and religion, thus, converge in anthropology. 
Hence, a man can be seen now as a universal 
synthesis of empirical and transcendental. The 
question «what is a man?» cannot be regarded 
exclusively abstractive, as a man is a tenement of 
actual existence and definite reality – a man acts 
and creates as a practical active being. It follows 
that, because all being refers to a man (and, 
thus, to anthropology), this science becomes 
comprehensive. This is how anthropological 
quadrangle is formed. 
Henceforth, anthropology ceases to be just 
another philosophical discipline. Contrariwise, it 
emerges as key configuration of philosophy. All 
philosophical problems can be now reduced to 
the question of the essence of man and his place 
in the cosmos. Science provides a number of 
different conceptions of the human being which 
are all too narrow to encompass the whole human 
being. They treat the human being as a thing but 
he is not a thing. Philosophy’s task, according to 
Scheler, was  to liberate itself from the bonds of 
scientific method. Philosophy must no more be 
the mere servant of the sciences than the servant 
of religious faith. In fact, rather than following 
the sciences, Scheler argues that a philosophical 
anthropology must precede the sciences. “If there 
is a philosophical task that must be solved in 
our time that it is the creation of Philosophical 
anthropology. I mean a fundamental science 
about human being and its structure, about its 
relation to nature (minerals, plants, animals) and 
to the essence of all things, about his metaphysical 
source and his physical, mental and spiritual 
emergence in the world, about forces and powers 
that he is driven with and that he drives, about 
main directions and laws of his mental, spiritual 
and historical and social development. And here 
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also comes the psychophysical problem of body 
and soul, and noetically-vital problem.  Only 
such an anthropology can furnish an ultimate 
philosophical basis, as well as definite aims of 
research, to all sceinces concerned with the object 
“man”, to the natural, medical, archeological, 
ethnological, historical, and social sciences...» 
(Sheler, 1994, p. 70). All forms of being are 
dependent on human’s being. Thus, only the 
explanation of the human essence – which is the 
goal of the «philosophical anthropology» – can 
become the basis for the understanding of truth 
about all other things.
It is important to note, that anthropological 
configuration of philosophy does not necessarily 
imply anthropocentrism and can analyze a man 
in a different set up – in its relation to something 
transcendental, for instance (the Other, Death, God 
etc.). Yet, independent of its modality (religious, 
social, existential etc.), anthropology is always 
predefined by a metaphysical situation which 
a man is placed onto. Within the metaphysical 
tradition a human being, its place and its function 
were defined according to a certain archetype of 
order (Cosmos, God, Nature) that organized and 
guaranteed the unity of human nature. With the 
emergence of social sciences (beginning with 
XIX century and the formation of sociology as 
discipline of science) the function of such an 
archetype is transmitted to sociality – socially it 
becomes the metaphysical reality reigning over 
people and subordinating all other dimensions 
and possibilities of existence. These possibilities 
become seen just as private cases of social 
cosmos. A human gets hermetically sealed into 
the system of social coordinates. The same is 
witnessed with the anthropological configuration 
of philosophy – all different modalities of 
anthropology are predefined by the metaphysical 
set of the cognition of the world. «Anthropology 
is that interpretation of man that already knows 
fundamentally what man is and hence can never 
ask who he may be. For with this question it would 
have to confess itself shaken and overcome. But 
how can this be expected of anthropology when 
the latter has expressly to achieve nothing less 
than the securing consequent upon the self-
secureness of the subiectum?» (Heidegger, 1990, 
p. 61). 
Philosophy as anthropology inevitably faces 
the logic of «double bind» and by the nature of 
things plunges into «anthroplogical sleep» – 
«The anthropological configuration of modern 
philosophy consists in doubling over dogmatism, 
in dividing it into two different levels each lending 
support to and limiting the other: the pre-critical 
analysis of what man is in his essence becomes 
the analytic of everything that can, in general, 
be presented to man’s experience» (Foucault, 
1977, p. 437). On the one hand, it is derived from 
the readymade and constructed concept of a 
man and then, in history and in various types of 
historicity (obviously, history itself is considered 
readymade) it searches for forms and means of 
expressions of the already-constructed man. On 
the other hand, anthropology – in distrust with 
any transcendental speculative schemata – relies 
on history in its search for forms and means of 
expressions of a man. It seems like the second 
approach is more preferable. Yet, it is frequently 
accused in its relativism. Nevertheless, it is not the 
matter of relativism that discredits that approach 
but the following question: if we do not have even 
the smallest understanding of what is a man, what 
should we call «a man» in history? Moreover, the 
very fact that this approach relies on history is 
the direct evidence that it implicitly relies on a 
certain historical concept of a man. These two 
approaches – opposite at the first glance – really 
are the sides of the same coin – they are impossible 
without each other. Each one asserts its legitimacy 
through the discretization of the other. Moreover, 
each of them hunts for the resources of the other. 
On the one hand, the transcendental schemata 
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will search for the already-constructed concept 
of a man in history and nothing else. On the other 
hand, relativism will always found itself on the 
already-constructed concept of man. «In order to 
awaken thought from such a sleep – so deep that 
thought experiences it paradoxically as vigilance, 
… in order to find a basis for itself within 
itself with the agility and anxiety of a radically 
philosophical thought – in order to recall it to 
the possibilities of its earliest dawning, there is 
no other way than to destroy the anthropological 
“quadrilateral” in its very foundations and start 
thinking in a space without a person» (Foucault, 
1977, p. 437-438).
Philosophy as Heterology
Going beyond the limits of these definitions 
is connected with the justification of the premise 
of difference of being in its presence and the very 
event of the presence. This difference founds its 
own “object” of thought. It is important to note 
that this object should not be understood as a 
side or aspect of reality because reality, at least, 
in its actuality or materiality, is subordinated by 
the authority of the scientific thought. In a sense, 
reality is an object of science. Yet, this object, is 
precisely not an object; it is precisely that which 
cannot be turned into an object, or that which, 
in being turned into an object, ceases to be the 
object of thought. Alternatively speaking, in 
any object the very unobjectifiable is the object 
of thought. Due to this very unobjectifiability, 
thought escapes metaphysical representations. 
At the same time, because this object escapes 
representations, metaphysics thinks. The 
object of thought, hence, is what metaphysics 
does not think but what it founds its thinking 
on. What is then this un-thought which serves 
as the basis metaphysics thinks and represents 
upon? What is this un-thought that allows 
thought to go beyond the limits of metaphysics? 
Going beyond those limits is going from the 
difference between being and essence to the 
difference between being and the becoming of 
being. Thinking takes place within beings and 
at the same time within that which is excessive 
in relation to beings. This very excessiveness 
is what lacks in being to reach its essence. In 
other words, it is a question of uncovering an 
excess proper to immanence itself, a residue or 
supplement within immanence. Nature in its 
immanence excludes any transcendence. It is, 
then, about the release of excessiveness peculiar 
to immanence itself. Being as becoming-event 
escapes any representation and is given in 
excessiveness of immanence. It is impossible 
to comprehend contemporary science without 
this excessiveness of being as becoming. 
Contemporary science is critical towards the very 
ontological premises of classical metaphysics 
and an the same time releases the possibility of 
a different ontology – differentiated ontology or 
heterology. It follows that ontology undergoes 
a double transformation here: first, ontology 
transforms into onto-genesis – the study of 
becoming of various systems and phenomena; 
second, ontology becomes heterogenesis – the 
study of becoming as becoming of difference, 
plurality and multiplicity.
Escape from the limits of metaphysics 
is only possible when being is understood 
as operation – in other words, when being 
transforms into presence as genetic and 
differentiated condition of  a real experience 
instead of a possible one. In other words, the 
escape is only possible when difference is 
reformulated as difference-becoming of being 
and essence – as difference-becoming of pre-
individual and individual, virtual and actual. 
The transformation of the status and meaning 
of ontological difference between being and 
essence – the moment when «to be» (as becoming) 
in its difference from essence is understood as 
genetic and differentiated condition of the actual 
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experience – is followed by the transformation 
of the concept of becoming itself. Becoming – 
being a non-linear process of transition from 
one actual to another actual – can be seen as a 
transition from the actual through the dynamic 
field of virtual tendencies to the actualization of 
this very field into the new actual. Becoming is 
understood here as the very difference insofar 
as it divides and separates actualizing virtual 
differences (Deleuze, 1998, p. 57-58).
The fact that the virtual is actual and forms 
an aspect of actual is of principal significance 
here. The actuality of the virtual is constituted 
upon differentiated elements, their inter-relations 
and the singular points correlative to them. It 
means that the virtual is fully defined and denotes 
genetic differentiated elements. Nevertheless, 
virtual, in spite of its definitiveness, is just 
an aspect of an object. Actuality constitutes 
another aspect. Between these two aspects of an 
object or of an actual, takes place a transition, 
a transposition, but not a mediation. Mediation 
takes place solely among readymade, already- 
constituted and individualized things, while 
becoming – is a movement of actualization from 
virtual to actual. Consequently, actualization – 
is another aspect of the process due to which a 
phenomena phenomenalizes. The question here 
is how virtual multiplicities realize as actualities. 
The relationship between these two sides is not 
the relationship of sameness and likeness, an 
authenticity and an image, a model and a copy. 
Insofar as virtual is repeated in actual, it is 
repetition-in-difference. And if virtual is repeated 
in actual, it is repetition through difference, 
the result of which is heterogeneity between 
repetition and the repeated.
The transformation of the ontological 
difference presupposed here itself presupposes 
the decisive turn from metaphysics of substance 
and essence. In heterological perspective, Being 
is no more equated with substance or essence, but 
is instead equated to an event. It is no more the 
foundation of being, but what being does not found 
itself upon. Heterology is neither not fundamental 
nor un-fundamental ontology. Contrariwise, it 
is the ontology of groundlessness. Ontology no 
more escapes from becoming as the only modality 
of being. Philosophy turns its face to this un-
foundation as to the condition of becoming for 
the material systems and others and explores 
the time-space of actualization of these systems. 
Unlike substances and essence, multiplicities 
are definite and singular universalities: not 
generalities that subordinate private instances, 
but series of singularities-events due to which 
the actual processes form. In contrast to 
general essences, universality of multiplicites is 
dispersive: different realizations of multipliticites 
by no means are correlative to those multiplicities 
and there is no limit to the potential dispersive 
forms of that realization. These un-correlations 
are enhanced by the fact that multiplicities grant 
form to a process but not to a final product. Thus, 
results of processes that realize one and the same 
multiplicity are radically different from each 
other. Unlike essences as abstract generalities 
coexisting with each other and yet different from 
each other, definitive generalities exist in the form 
of network continuum. Any multiplicity exists as 
melange of multiplicites that forms continuous 
immanent space rather different from the space of 
archetypes and equally different from the spaces 
of organized and discrete elements.
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Концепции философии  
в современном мире
Т. Х. Керимов 
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Статья посвящена анализу различных сосуществующих концепций философии. Цель 
статьи – показать наиболее значимые концепции философии: метафизическую, научную 
и антропологическую, определить теоретические мотивы, меняющие их характер и 
методологию. В статье провозглашается необходимость новой, дифференциальной 
онтологии – гетерологии, радикально трансформирующей природу самой философии.   
Ключевые слова: философия, метафизика, философия науки, антропология, гетерология. 
